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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and Sheryl Holmes ("Plaintiffs") contracted with 
Defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet ("Mountain Tech / Defendant") to install 
kitchen and bathroom cabinets in their home. Mountain Tech delivered defective 
cabinets, and the Holmes brought this action against Mountain Tech for breach of 
contract and breach of warranty after Mountain Tech failed to correct the problems. The 
jury rendered a verdict in their favor. Mountain Tech appeals from three of the trial 
court's rulings. Specifically, Mountain Tech challenges the trial judge's decisions to: (1) 
refuse to allow Mountain Tech to recall plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness; (2) 
award plaintiffs' counsel $24,000.00 in attorney's fees; and (3) deny Mountain Tech 
attorney's fees. 
Because the trial court's rulings on all three issues were proper and because 
Mountain Tech has failed to properly preserve its claims for appeal, plaintiffs request that 
this court affirm Judge Iwasaki's rulings. In addition, plaintiffs request that this court 
award their attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) and § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Mountain Tech 
to call plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness? A trial judge enjoys considerable 
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latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence. A decision whether to admit 
rebuttal testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 
1[19, 29 P.2d 638, 644. Even if erroneous, the trial court's decision may not be 
overturned unless it was harmful error. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (reversible error is one which undermines confidence in the verdict). See 
also Utah R. Evid. 103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected...."). 
2. Should the trial court's award to plaintiffs of $24,000 in attorney's fees be 
affirmed? The question of whether attorney's fees are recoverable is a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). However, the question of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee is one 
respecting which the trial court has considerable discretion. Its decision will be reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Id. Moreover, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's 
decision even if it failed to make explicit findings on the record "whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." Id. at 316. 
3. Should the trial court's decision to deny Mountain Tech's motion for 
attorney's fees be affirmed? A trial court's decision that a party is not legally entitled to 
attorney's fees is a decision of law, which will be reviewed for correctness. Valcarce, 
961 P.2d at 315. However, in order to challenge such a ruling, a party must adequately 
preserve its claim for appeal. Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 
1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2001), relating to attorney's fees provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's iees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This case concerned a contract dispute between plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and 
Sheryl Holmes and defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet ("Mountain Tech"). In the 
summer of 1996, Mountain Tech agreed to design, construct, and install kitchen and 
bathroom cabinets in the plaintiffs' home for $10,066.00. The cabinets arrived 
piecemeal, and the plaintiffs found the color of the cabinets to be wrong and the 
workmanship substandard. In particular, many of the cabinets had nicks, chattering, 
inconsistent staining, and all were constructed of inferior materials. While Mountain 
Tech initially promised to remedy these problems, Mountain Tech failed to fix the 
cabinets and the plaintiffs were forced to file this action to recover damages for breach of 
contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. 
Although this case involved a relatively routine contract dispute, the litigation was 
anything but ordinary in both the pretrial and trial stages. Initially defendant failed to 
timely answer the complaint, and the trial court entered a default judgment. The 
defendant eventually was successful in setting aside the default judgment, and filed a 
counterclaim for the $1,000.00 remaining contract balance. During discovery, defense 
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counsel repeatedly failed to comply with discovery deadlines and was sanctioned by the 
trial court on at least three separate occasions. 
At trial, this suit over a $10,066.00 contract lasted for four days. Eleven witnesses 
were called, with seven of them called by Mountain Tech. At the conclusion of trial, 
plaintiffs prevailed on all counts. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs on the 
breach of contract claim in the amount of $7000.00, and on the breach of warranty claim 
in the amount of $2000.00. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on 
the defendant's counterclaim. 
After trial plaintiffs' counsel submitted an application for a fee award pursuant to 
the parties' contract and Utah statute. This application was supported by a detailed 
affidavit. Mountain Tech opposed plaintiffs' application and filed its own request for 
attorney's fees. The trial court issued specific findings that addressed the merits of 
plaintiffs' fee application and the various factors outlined in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The trial court determined that plaintiffs should be awarded 
$24,000.00 in fees. Mountain Tech's fee request was denied. Mountain Tech has 
appealed. 
n. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review 
A. The Contract and Mountain Tech's Failure to Perform* 
In July of 1996, plaintiffs Siegfried Pollesche and Sheryl Holmes visited Mountain 
Tech's showroom to look for kitchen and bathroom cabinets for their newly-remodeled 
home. Michael O'Neal, a sales representative for Mountain Tech, assisted Pollesche and 
187289.3 
11/05/01 
4 
Holmes. He showed them a display of high-quality hardwood kitchen and bathroom 
cabinets. The cabinets appeared to be well made, and the plaintiffs expressed interest in 
having the same type of cabinets installed in their home. (Complaint % 5-6, R. 2). 
On July 25, 1996, the plaintiffs signed a written agreement under which Mountain 
Tech agreed to construct and install kitchen and bathroom cabinets in the plaintiffs' home 
at a cost of $10,066.00. The plaintiffs paid $5,000.00 as the initial down payment, with 
40% of the purchase price to be paid at the time of delivery, and the remaining 10% to be 
paid upon completion of the work. (Complaint f 7, R. 2). Mountain Tech failed to 
deliver the cabinets by the contract deadline. However, eventually some, but not all, of 
the cabinets were delivered on September 3, 1996. At that time, the plaintiffs paid 
Mountain Tech $4,000.00 pursuant to the contract. (Complaint % 10, R. 3). 
Although the plaintiffs were informed that the cabinets would be of the same 
quality as those in the showroom display, the plaintiffs discovered several defects while 
the cabinets were being installed. In particular, the materials used to construct the 
cabinets were not of the same high quality as those used in the display. In addition, the 
cabinets had chatter, nicks, and inconsistent color stain. (Complaint 1f 9, Tf 11, R.3). In 
response to complaints, on September 11, 1996, Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal, both 
employees of Mountain Tech, visited the plaintiffs' home. Both men assured the 
plaintiffs that Mountain Tech would remedy the situation. (Complaint If 12, R. 3). After 
receiving these assurances, Pollesche and Holmes allowed Mountain Tech to continue 
installing the cabinets. (Complaint f^ 13, R.3). 
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On October 1, 1996, Mountain Tech delivered additional cabinets. These cabinets 
were also inferior in both quality and workmanship to the cabinets in Mountain Tech's 
showroom. The stain on these cabinets was much darker than the stain on those cabinets 
previously delivered, and the cabinets were scratched and disfigured. (Complaint % 14, 
R. 3). Pollesche and Holmes again complained about the quality, workmanship, and 
construction of the cabinets. They also informed Mountain Tech that not all the cabinets 
had been delivered on time, that approximately 62 handles had not been installed, and 
that some of the doors to the cabinets did not fit (Complaint f^ 15, R. 4). Mountain Tech 
informed the plaintiffs that it would not take any further corrective measures. (Complaint 
Tfl6, R. 4). The plaintiffs refused to pay the balance due under the contract. 
B. The Litigation and Mountain Tech's Dilatory Tactics. 
On October 30, 1997, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, 
breach of warranty and fraud. (Complaint % 22, 27, 34, R. 6-8). Mountain Tech did not 
timely respond to the plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court entered a default judgment on 
December 22, 1997. (R. 12). Mountain Tech thereafter responded to the plaintiffs' 
complaint on December 29, 1997. It filed an answer and counterclaim. (R. 18). The 
counterclaim alleged breach of contract in the amount of $2,496.00, representing the 
balance due on the contract. (R. 27). The default judgment was eventually set aside. 
The court awarded plaintiffs' counsel nominal fees of $200.00 in connection with 
obtaining the default judgment. (R. 104). 
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During discovery, Mountain Tech was continually tardy in filing its responses, 
resulting in the trial court awarding sanctions against it. Plaintiffs served interrogatories, 
requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents on March 20, 1998. 
(R. 147). Mountain Tech did not answer the discovery requests. (R. 180). Plaintiffs then 
filed for summary judgment on June 8, 1998—based on Mountain Tech's complete 
failure to answer discovery requests or advance any evidence disputing the alleged facts 
(R. 134). Defendant responded to the motion five days after the required deadline— 
including affidavits of Michael O'Neal and Russell Groomer which contradicted the 
substance of the unanswered request for admissions. (R. 178, 180). The trial court 
denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but it imposed sanctions on 
Mountain Tech for failing to comply with discovery and other procedural deadlines. 
Among the sanctions, the court ordered that the defendant's responses to the plaintiffs' 
request for admissions be stricken. (R. 273). In addition, the trial court awarded 
plaintiffs' counsel $500.00 for being induced to bring the motion by Mountain Tech's 
failure to contest the facts. (R. 274). 
Although the trial court had warned that further discovery delays would not be 
tolerated (R. 274), Mountain Tech again made an untimely request, this time to inspect 
the plaintiffs' property. (R. 359). Plaintiffs' counsel objected to the untimely motion, 
and was again awarded nominal fees in the amount of $200.00, although it granted the 
tardy request. (R. 365; R. 391). 
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The defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim against 
Russell Groomer, which motion was granted. (R. 530). The remaining allegations of 
breach of contract and breach of warranty, along with the Defendant's counterclaim, were 
submitted for trial. Although this is a relatively minor contract dispute, the jury trial 
lasted four days. Eleven witnesses appeared. (R. 993, Table of Contents). Mountain 
Tech called seven witnesses, four of whom were independent experts. (R. 993, Table of 
Contents). 
C. The Attempt of Mountain Tech to Call Plaintiff Sheryl Holmes as a Rebuttal 
Witness, 
Sheryl Holmes was called by plaintiffs as part of their case in chief. During her 
cross examination, counsel for Mountain Tech asked Ms. Holmes to compare the quality 
of materials used in the showroom display to that of the cabinets that were installed in her 
home. (R. 994, T. 233-34). Plaintiffs' counsel successfully objected to this line of 
questioning on grounds of lack of foundation for her being able to make such a 
comparison and on the grounds that it called for speculation. (R. 994, T. 234). 
During its case in chief, the defense called its employee, Russell Groomer, to the 
stand. (R. 995, T. 413). He testified about the quality of materials used in the 
construction of the cabinets, and was specifically questioned about the quality of 
materials in the showroom display. (R. 995, T. 424-37). Defendant also called another 
employee, Mike O'Neal, who was also questioned extensively about the showroom 
display, Sheryl Holmes' visits to the showroom, and the quality of materials used. (R. 
996, T. 592-600). 
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Counsel for Mountain Tech then indicated that it intended to recall Sheryl Holmes 
as a rebuttal witness to question her about the quality of materials used to construct the 
cabinets in her home. (R. 996, T. 656-57). Plaintiffs' counsel again objected to this 
testimony on the grounds of foundation, arguing that Ms. Holmes was not qualified to 
discuss the materials. (R. 996, T. 657). Plaintiffs' counsel further objected that the 
testimony would be cumulative as other defense witnesses had already discussed the 
quality of materials and compared the cabinets in the home with those in the showroom 
display. (R. 996, T. 657). 
After hearing argument, the trial court determined that Sheryl Holmes could not be 
called as a rebuttal witness for two reasons. First, the court found that the testimony 
would be cumulative. (R. 996, T. 658). Second, the court found that Ms. Holmes lacked 
foundation to testify on this issue because "she is not a carpenter [and] does not have 
specific expertise and the ability to compare exactly what she may have viewed in the 
display as to what was in her home..." (R. 996, T. 658). The trial judge further explained 
his ruling by noting that Ms. Holmes would be "a lay witness" and "that there was even 
among expert witnesses some disagreement as to what was and what was not standard 
quality and standard building and construction materials of the cabinets." (R. 996, T. 
658). 
The jury awarded the plaintiffs $7,000.00 for breach of contract and $2,000.00 for 
breach of warranty. The jury also found in favor of the plaintiffs on Mountain Tech's 
counterclaim. (R. 721-22). 
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D. The Attorney's Fees Application and Award. 
After trial, plaintiffs' counsel submitted an application for award of attorney's fees 
and non-taxable costs. This request was made pursuant to a combination of the provision 
in the parties' contract that allowed recovery of attorney's fees by Mountain Tech, and a 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, which grants a reciprocal right of recovery of attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party in any action arising out of a contract allowing attorney fees 
to one party. (R. 726). 
Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a detailed affidavit outlining the calculation of his 
fees as well as detailed billing statements, and a summary of the hourly rates charged by 
plaintiffs' counsel, associates, and legal staff. (R. 735). (Affidavit of Bryon J. 
Benevento, R. 733-79). Plaintiffs' counsel explicitly stated that the plaintiffs were "not 
seeking fees and/or costs associated with the fraud claim originally asserted against 
Russell Groomer." (R. 735). Therefore, plaintiffs' counsel deducted "one-third of the 
cost associated in preparing the Complaint, the time spent to respond to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim, the time spent at hearings on 
defendant's motions for summary judgment, and the time spent in preparing jury 
instructions relating to the fraud claim." (R. 882). Fees were also reduced by $950.00 to 
reflect sanctions paid by Mountain Tech, and taxable court costs were excluded as well. 
(R. 735) After considering these deductions, plaintiffs' total request for attorney's fees 
and costs amounted to $27,783.44. (R. 736). 
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Defendant's counsel then filed an untimely memorandum opposing plaintiffs' 
motion. (R. 876). Defendant also sought fees in the amount of $9,428.00 for its defense 
of the fraud claim, or in the alternative, "89% or $16,752.00 of the fees charged [to 
Mountain Tech by its counsel] as the jury's verdict awarded plaintiffs only 11% of the 
prayed for relief." (R. 807). Defendant's counsel did not submit any billing statements 
or affidavits to verify these fees were actually charged and did not provide an itemized 
description of the services provided. (R. 801-08). 
Judge Iwasaki issued a minute entry outlining his findings. He denied Mountain 
Tech's request for fees and awarded plaintiffs $24,000.00 in attorney's fees. (R. 896). 
Judge Iwasaki found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney's fees under the 
contract provisions and the Utah statute allowing for reciprocal fees. (R. 896, f^ 2). He 
also expressly considered the factors outlined by Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 
Specifically, he found: 
[T]he court is of the opinion that the legal work was actually performed, that for 
most part, it was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, that the 
attorneys' billing rates were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, and that this was not a case that was overly 
complicated, except for the need to respond and to compel defendants throughout 
the litigation...." 
(R. 894-95, % 4). He also noted that plaintiffs' fees were reasonable in that they were 
comparable to the amount of fees charged by defense counsel. (R. 895, f^ 6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's decision to refuse to allow Sheryl Holmes to be called as a 
rebuttal witness was appropriate and should be affirmed. The trial judge properly 
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determined that Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify regarding the quality of 
materials used to construct the cabinets, and that her testimony would be cumulative 
because the defense had already presented this evidence through other witnesses. Even 
assuming the trial court's decision was in error, it was not harmful because there is no 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if she had testified. 
The trial court's decision to award the plaintiffs $24,000.00 in attorney's fees 
should also be affirmed. Judge Iwasaki was presented with sufficient evidence and made 
sufficient specific findings of fact to satisfy the standards set forth in Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). Moreover, Mountain Tech's brief before this court 
has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial judge's decision and, therefore, it 
has not met its preliminary burden on appeal. Accordingly, the trial judge's award of 
fees should be affirmed. 
Finally, the trial court's decision to deny Mountain Tech's claim for attorney's 
fees should be affirmed. Mountain Tech has no claim for recovery of fees under Utah 
law. Alternatively, it has failed to properly preserve its claim for appeal. 
Thus, the trial court's decisions on all issues should be affirmed. Plaintiffs further 
request that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
This award is available pursuant to Utah case law and the parties' contract. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Refusing to Allow Mountain 
Tech to Recall Sheryl Holmes as a Rebuttal Witness. 
In its brief, Mountain Tech contends that its counsel wished to recall Ms. Holmes 
in order to question her about the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets in her 
home, as well as the cost to repair the cabinets. (Appellant's Brief, 12-13). Plaintiffs' 
counsel objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection, stating that the witness 
lacked foundation and that the testimony would be cumulative. The trial court's decision 
should be affirmed as being within the proper exercise of judicial discretion. 
Trial courts are granted a considerable amount of latitude in determining whether 
to admit testimony. A trial court's refusal to allow a rebuttal witness to testify is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and will not be overturned unless the decision 
affected the outcome of the trial. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct App. 
1998). See also Green v. Louden 2001 UT 62, fl9; 29 P.3d 638, 644 ("We review 
challenges to the admission of rebuttal testimony for abuse of discretion."); Utah R. Evid. 
103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected...."). Therefore, Mountain Tech must 
show not only that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its request to call Ms. 
Holmes, but also that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different but for the error. Mountain Tech has failed to carry this burden. 
187289.3 
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A. Defendant Had Not Laid Sufficient Foundation to Warrant Sheryl 
Holmes Testifying Regarding the Quality of Materials, and her 
Testimony Would Have Been Cumulative. 
The trial court's refusal to allow the defense to recall Ms. Holmes was correct for 
several reasons. First, Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify as to the quality of 
materials used to construct the cabinets. Second, Mountain Tech was able to question 
other witnesses on this issue, and therefore Ms. Holmes testimony would have been 
cumulative. 
On the first point, Ms. Holmes lacked foundation to testify as to the quality of the 
materials. As the court noted, Ms. Holmes "is not a carpenter [and] does not have 
specific expertise and the ability to compare exactly what she may have viewed in the 
display as to what was in her home..." (R. 996, T. 658). The trial judge further explained 
that Ms. Holmes would be "a lay witness" and "that there was even among expert 
witnesses some disagreement as to what was and what was not standard quality and 
standard building and construction materials of the cabinets." (R. 996, T. 658). 
Appellate courts have traditionally deferred to the trial judge's decision regarding 
the "necessity of testimony and the qualifications of the witness...." Stagmeyer v. 
Leatham Bros., Inc.. 20 Utah 2d 421, 425; 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968). In this instance, the 
trial judge made a rational and well-reasoned determination that Ms. Holmes lacked the 
necessary foundation to testify about the materials, and rightfully denied her testimony as 
a rebuttal witness. 
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On the second point, the trial court correctly concluded that Ms. Holmes' 
testimony would be cumulative. In the presentation of its defense, Mountain Tech called 
several witnesses, including Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal. Both men were 
questioned extensively about the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets and 
the plaintiffs' visit to Moxmtain Tech's showroom display. (R. 995, T. 424-37); (R. 996, 
T. 592-600). Because the defense's own witnesses had akeady addressed these issues, 
the trial court ruled that Ms. Holmes' testimony would be cumulative. Utah appellate 
courts have recognized that evidence is considered cumulative and may be excluded if it 
has already been admitted in another form. Dahnken v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 422 
(Utah 1986) (documents were considered cumulative because their substance had akeady 
been admitted through oral testimony). Thus, the trial court's decision to deny Ms. 
Holmes' rebuttal testimony was clearly appropriate. 
B. Mountain Tech has Failed to Prove that the Trial Court's Decision was 
Prejudicial and, therefore, any Error is Harmless. 
Even if this court finds that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Ms. Holmes to 
testify, the trial court should still be affirmed because Mountain Tech has failed to show 
that had she testified, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome at trial. Or, 
in other words, that "the likelihood of a different outcome [is] sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct 
App. 1998). Mountain Tech has failed to satisfy this standard. 
In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that the trial court's refusal to allow Ms. 
Holmes to testify constituted prejudicial error for two reasons. First, Mountain Tech 
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argues that if Ms. Holmes had been recalled, they could have questioned her about the 
cost of repairing the cabinets and would have proven a lower damage amount. Second, 
Mountain Tech argues that defense counsel could have gotten Ms. Holmes to testify that 
the quality of materials used to construct the cabinets was the same as that in the 
showroom. (Appellant's Brief, 14). Neither of these points is sufficient. 
Mountain Tech's first argument is that Ms. Holmes would have testified that it 
cost only $4,015.19 to repair the cabinets, an amount far lower than the damages 
awarded. (Appellant's Brief, 14). The point is moot, however, because Mountain Tech 
failed to properly raise this issue at trial and therefore has waived the argument on appeal. 
At trial, Mountain Tech's counsel stated that it intended to call Ms. Holmes as a rebuttal 
witness for purposes of comparing the cabinets in the display with those in her home. (R. 
996, T. 656). Defense counsel never indicated to the court that Ms. Holmes would be 
recalled to testify about the amount of damages. (R. 996, T. 656-658). Because defense 
counsel has failed to properly present the issue to the trial judge in the first instance, the 
point has not been preserved for appeal. Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99 ^ [16, 17 
P.3d 1110, 1115 (citing State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) ("Parties claiming 
error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their 
allegations with an adequate record.") 
Mountain Tech also contends that Ms. Holmes would have testified "that the 
cabinets she saw at the display in 1996 were of the same quality and materials as those 
that were eventually installed in her home." (Appellant's Brief, 14). This simply is not 
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true. Ms. Holmes has never given that testimony in the past, and also lacked the requisite 
expertise to make that comparison at trial. At her deposition, Ms. Holmes was asked if 
she inspected the displays, and she answered that she did not recall. (Deposition of 
Sheryl Holmes, p. 59, lines 9-10. A partial copy of Ms. Holmes5 deposition is attached 
hereto as an Addendum.) Despite Ms. Holmes' lack of knowledge, defense counsel 
continued to ask questions about the display. Plaintiffs counsel objected several times to 
this line of questioning on the grounds of foundation, as Ms. Holmes had never actually 
identified the display. (Deposition of Sheryl Holmes, p. 45, lines 13-25; p. 51-52; p. 81, 
lines 1-8). 
Furthermore, Mountain Tech was able to extensively question several witnesses, 
including both Russell Groomer and Mike O'Neal, regarding the materials used to 
construct the cabinets, and put in evidence favorable to it. The jury thus considered this 
evidence in rendering its verdict. (R. 995, T. 424-37); (R. 996, T. 592-600). The trial 
court's decision was, at most, harmless error. Utah v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 
1983) ("Where evidence is excluded by the trial court, any error which may have resulted 
from such exclusion is cured where the substance of the evidence is later admitted 
through some other means."); Dahnken, 726 P.2d at 422 (Utah 1986) (exclusion of 
cumulative evidence admitted through oral evidence was at most harmless error). 
Because Mountain Tech cannot show that any error in the trial court's ruling 
undermines confidence in the verdict, the decision should be affirmed. 
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EL The Trial Court's Specific Findings and Award of Attorney's Fees to 
Plaintiffs' Counsel Should be Affirmed. 
A. Plaintiffs Were Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Defendant Was Not. 
Utah Law only allows recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to contract or statute. 
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In this 
case, the parties executed an agreement containing the following provision: 
In event payments are not made as per contract provided herein, and in the event 
Seller employs an attorney for the purpose of enforcing terms hereof, the Buyer 
agrees to pay all costs of any such legal proceedings. 
(R. 263). This provision only granted Mountain Tech a right to recover fees and costs in 
the event of a breach. However, the plaintiffs have a reciprocal right, by virtue of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-27-56.5 (2001), which reads: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Thus, by virtue of the contract and Utah law, the prevailing party on a claim to enforce 
the contract may be awarded attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs Pollesche and Holmes were clearly the prevailing party on the contract 
claims in this action. The jury returned a special verdict awarding the plaintiffs 
$7,000.00 for breach of contract and $2,000.00 for breach of warranty. The jury also 
rejected Mountain Tech's counterclaim based on plaintiffs' non-payment of the final 
installment. (R. 721-22). 
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In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that it prevailed in its summary judgment 
motion directed at the fraud claim. This argument is founded on a misperception of law. 
Utah law only provides for attorney's fees pursuant to contract or statute. Common law 
fraud claims do not arise out of a contract or statute, but rather are based on the tort 
theory of intentional wrongdoing. Because fraud is an action in tort, attorney's fees for 
the fraud claim could not be recovered regardless of which party prevailed. Foote v. 
Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998) (denying fees for tort-based actions). Accordingly, 
the sole issue concerning the propriety of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award is whether it 
was appropriate in amount. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Determined that an Award of $24,000 in 
Attorney's Fees was Appropriate. 
The trial court's decision to award plaintiffs' counsel $24,000.00 in attorney's fees 
should be affirmed. The lead Utah case on attorney's fees is Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, which sets forth four factors that the trial court should consider when awarding 
attorney's fees. Factors include the following: 
(1) What legal work was actually performed? 
(2) How much of the legal work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? 
(3) Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rate customarily charged in 
locality for similar services? and 
(4) Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors? 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. A trial court has "broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes a reasonable fee" and the appellate court will review the trial court's 
findings on the four Dixie State Bank criteria under an abuse of discretion standard. 
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Dixie State Bank v. Branken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). Moreover, the appellate 
courts will uphold the trial court's decision "even if it failed to make findings on the 
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)).1 
1. The Trial Court Entered Specific Findings of Fact and there is 
Sufficient Evidence to Support the Ruling. 
By minute entry, Judge Iwasaki issued specific findings on the four Dixie State 
Bank factors. Paragraph 4 of the judge's ruling reads as follows: 
Turning to the factors regarding attorney's fees as set forth in Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, [1] the Court is of the opinion that the legal work was actually 
performed, [2] that for the most part, it was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter, [3] that the attorneys' billing rates were consistent with the 
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services, and [4] that this was 
not a case that was overly complicated, except for the need to respond and to 
compel defendants throughout litigation.... (R. 895) (bracketed material added.) 
There was ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the Dixie 
State Bank factors were satisfied. First, there has never been any dispute that the legal 
services were actually performed. In its fee application, the plaintiffs' counsel submitted 
its billing statements as well as a detailed affidavit outlining the calculation of fees. 
(Affidavit of Bryon J. Benevento, R. 733-79). The billing statements contained a detailed 
description of the time spent, hourly rates charged, and services provided. (R. 738-79). 
1
 While Mountain Tech has challenged the award of attorney's fees, it has not raised any argument on 
appeal as to reasonableness of the amount of the fees. Moreover, the fact that Mountain Tech's counsel 
charged its client almost $20,000 in legal fees indicates that the total fees charged by plaintiffs' counsel 
were reasonable and comparable to local standards. (R. 895). However, plaintiffs address the 
reasonableness question out of an abundance of caution. 
187289.3 2 0 
11/05/01 
Second, the court properly concluded that "for the most part" the legal work was 
reasonably necessary to prosecute this matter. Much of the work in this case was in 
response to defense counsel's tactics. Defense counsel repeated ignored discovery 
deadlines, received several sanctions from the court, and designated nine separate 
witnesses to testify at trial despite the fact that this was a relatively simple contract 
dispute. Among the trial court's findings, the judge noted that the plaintiffs were 
required "to respond and to compel defendants throughout the litigation...." (R. 895). 
The trial court did, however, reduce the plaintiffs' requested attorney's fees from 
$27,783.44 to $24,000.00. The trial court also noted that plaintiffs' fees seemed quite 
reasonable when compared to those charged by defense counsel. The court also noted 
that defense counsel had also charged his client approximately $20,000.00 in fees as well. 
(R. 895). 
Third, the court correctly concluded that the billing rates charged to the plaintiffs 
were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. 
The trial court carefully scrutinized the rates and made specific findings regarding the 
rates charged. In particular, the court noted that "some of the work done by the associates 
was billed at a lower rate." 
Finally, the trial court found that there were additional circumstances which 
required consideration in fixing the amount of fees. Among other items, the trial judge 
noted the "contentious history of this litigation" and plaintiffs' need "to compel 
defendants throughout the litigation." (R.895) The Utah Supreme Court has routinely 
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upheld the trial judge's decision regarding the amount of attorney's fees awarded, 
especially when there is evidence that opposing counsel has delayed litigation. Dixie 
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991 (finding opposing counsel's litigation strategy was 
appropriately considered as it complicated a routine case). Similarly, Utah courts have 
recognized that the trial court is generally "in a better position than an appellate court to 
gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the 
litigation." Richard Barton Enter., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). 
2. There is Sufficient Evidence from which this Court may Infer 
that the Trial Court made Sufficient Findings of Fact. 
As discussed above, the trial court made specific findings of fact regarding the 
award of attorney's fees and the factors outlined by Dixie State Bank. More importantly, 
even if these findings were deemed insufficient because the judge stated them in 
conclusory terms, there is sufficient evidence from which this court could infer those 
findings. Under Utah law, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's ruling "even if 
it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that 
the court actually made such findings." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (quoting State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)). In this case, plaintiffs' counsel submitted 
both a detailed affidavit and billing statements and also discussed the Dixie State Bank 
factors in its memoranda. (R. 878). Because this evidence was before the trial court, this 
court can easily and appropriately infer that the trial court made sufficient findings of 
fact. 
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In its brief, Mountain Tech discusses in detail Foote v: Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1998) and Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Neither case is inconsistent with the trial court's ruling. In Foote, the fees were 
necessarily reduced because the moving party sought fees for tort-based actions, which 
are not recoverable under Utah law. Foote, 962 P.2d at 56. In the case at hand, however, 
plaintiffs' counsel has not attempted to recover fees for its fraud claim, so no additional 
reduction of the award is required. 
Similarly, in Selvage, counsel submitted an uncontroverted application for 
attorney's fees. On its own initiative and without a motion from opposing counsel, the 
trial court reduced the requested attorney's fees from $175,000.00 to $42,500.00, without 
any explanation. Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1263. This court rightfully held that the trial court 
must "explain the basis for its sua sponte reduction" of an uncontroverted fee. Id. at 
1265. 
Selvage does not conflict with the trial court's decision below for several reasons. 
First, the trial court did not make a drastic reduction or increase in the amount of fees 
requested. Plaintiffs counsel requested $27,783.44 in attorney's fees, and this amount 
was reduced to $24,000.00 after the trial court compared plaintiffs' fees with those 
charged by opposing counsel Second, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact on 
the record to support its award, including a discussion of the complexity of the litigation 
and the need to compel opposing counsel. Further, even if these findings were deemed 
insufficient, the plaintiffs' counsel presented sufficient evidence below in the form of 
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affidavits and billing statements, from which the trial court could have made the requisite 
findings. Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision to award 
plaintiffs' counsel $24,000 in attorney's fees. 
C. Mountain Tech has Not Properly Challenged the Trial Court Findings. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's decision to award plaintiffs' counsel 
$24,000.00 in attorney's fees because Mountain Tech has failed to meet its burden on 
appeal. In its brief, Mountain Tech argues that the trial court's findings were conclusory, 
and that the trial judge failed to allocate the fees awarded among the successful and 
unsuccessful claims. Not only are these allegations unfounded, but Mountain Tech has 
failed to properly bring its challenge under Utah case law. 
Under Utah law, "to successfully challenge a trial court's findings, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. . . . After 
marshaling the supporting evidence, the appellant must show that, even when viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the trial court's findings." Utah v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108, 1112 
(citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312). Moutain Tech has failed to carry this 
burden. 
As previously discussed, the trial court not only made specific findings of fact as 
required by Dixie State Bank, but also took note of several facts which would support its 
ruling. For example, the trial judge considered the amount charged by defense counsel in 
determining whether the total fees were reasonable and even reduced the plaintiffs' 
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requested attorney's fees. Similarly, in issuing its ruling, the trial judge considered 
plaintiffs' billing statements, which precisely outline the time spent on each matter, the 
rate charged, and the services provided. (R. 735). Mountain Tech has failed to marshal 
this evidence, and other evidence, which supports the trial court's ruling. 
In addition, Mountain Tech has again placed undue emphasis on the dismissed 
fraud claim, contending that the trial court has failed to allocate the fees awarded between 
the successful and unsuccessful claims. This simply is not true. The plaintiffs never 
requested fees for the fraud claim, and accordingly, fees for the fraud claim were never 
awarded. In its fee application, plaintiffs' counsel explicitly stated that the plaintiffs were 
"not seeking fees and/or costs associated with the fraud claim originally asserted against 
Russell Groomer." (R. 735). Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel deducted ccone-third of the 
cost associated in preparing the Complaint, the time spent to respond to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim, the time spent at hearings on 
defendant's motions for summary judgment, and the time spent in preparing jury 
instructions relating to the fraud claim." (R. 882). After these deductions were 
accounted for, plaintiffs requested attorney's fees in the amount of $27,783.44. (R. 736). 
This evidence was available to the trial court in rendering its decision, and trial 
judge was fully aware that plaintiffs' counsel had deducted its fees incurred in bringing 
the fraud claim. A simple review of the plaintiffs' billing statements could easily verify 
that these amounts were indeed deducted. Mountain Tech has failed to bring this 
evidence to the attention of this court. This Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
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EH. The Trial Court Properly Denied Mountain Tech's Application for Attorney's Fees 
A. The Trial Court's Decision to Deny Mountain Tech Attorney's Fees Should 
be Affirmed as Mountain Tech has No Basis for Recovery Under Utah Law. 
Mountain Tech has argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
award Mountain Tech attorney's fees. However, Mountain Tech has no basis for 
recovering its fees under Utah law. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
It is well-established that under Utah law, attorney's fees may only be recovered 
pursuant to contract or statute. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 
1998); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Selvage v. J.J. 
Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This case initially 
involved a total of four claims: (1) plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract; (2) plaintiffs' 
claim for breach of warranty; (3) plaintiffs' fraud claim; and (4) Mountain Tech's 
counterclaim for breach of contract. Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that Mountain was 
successful in dismissing the fraud claim on summary judgment. However, there is no 
basis for recovering attorney's fees arising from the fraud claim. 
The fraud claim is distinct from the other claims since it does not arise out of the 
contract, but rather is based on the tort theory of intentional wrongdoing. Utah statute 
does not provide for recovery of attorney's fees in common law tort actions, and 
Mountain Tech has cited no authority indicating that such an award would be appropriate. 
Because fraud is an action in tort, attorney's fees for the fraud claim could not be 
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recovered regardless of which party prevailed on the issue. Fpote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 
56 (Utah 1998) (denying fees for tort-based actions). 
Mountain Tech's desire to collect attorney's fees on the fraud claim is not only 
without legal support, but to permit such an award would be bad policy. Plaintiffs 
Pollesche and Holmes were clearly the victims in this lawsuit. Mountain Tech sold the 
plaintiffs a shoddy product, then refused to correct the problem. Moreover, Mountain 
Tech continuously hindered the litigation process. (R. 880). The jury verdict provides 
conclusive proof that Mountain Tech was at fault. However, because this is a contract 
dispute, the plaintiffs were awarded only $9000.00 in damages, with no ability to obtain 
punitive damages. Plaintiffs also paid their attorneys over $29,000 in fees and costs. (R. 
880). 
The reality of this situation is that unless this court both affirms the lower court's 
decision to deny Mountain Tech attorney's fees, and affirms the award of plaintiffs' fees, 
the plaintiffs will lose money in this lawsuit and will be unable to remedy the defective 
cabinets that caused this litigation. Such a result would be unfair, contrary to the jury's 
verdict, and would effectively discourage any ordinary person from seeking relief in the 
courts over a minor contract dispute. Accordingly, Mountain Tech's argument for fees 
should be rejected. 
B. Mountain Tech has Failed to Preserve its Claim for Appeal. 
Alternatively, Mountain Tech should be denied attorney's fees on the fraud claim 
because it has failed to properly preserve its claim for appeal. "A party who is entitled to 
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attorneys fees and costs and fails to ask for all of them in the trial phase of the case, or 
fails to adduce adequate evidence in support of a finding of reasonable attorney's fees, 
waives any right to claim those fees later." Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 117. 
Mountain Tech's application for fees was untimely, factually insufficient, and failed to 
comply with Utah law. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 803 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1999) (attorney's 
fee affidavit should describe the legal services performed, together with the time spent for each 
service, and rate charged). Defendants' counsel submitted only a blanket affidavit requesting 
$19,240.00 in attorney's fees and $1,514.14 in taxable costs. (R. 795) Defense counsel has 
never submitted any billing statements to verify its fees were actually charged, and has not 
provided any description of the services performed. (R. 801-08). It is, at best, ironic that 
Mountain Tech has advocated that this court should judiciously scrutinize plaintiffs' award of 
attorney's fees, while Mountain Tech itself has failed to comply with the most basic of 
evidentiary requirements in requesting its own fees. The trial court has properly denied 
Mountain Tech's application and this decision should be affirmed. 
IV. Fees on Appeal. 
Plaintiffs Pollesche and Holmes respectfully request that this court award the 
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal, evidence of which will be submitted 
following decision. Pursuant to Utah law and the parties contract, plaintiffs are entitled 
to reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to refuse 
to allow the defense to recall Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness, its award of attorney's 
fees to plaintiffs in the amount of $24,000.00, and its denial of fees to Mountain Tech. 
The record on all three issues demonstrates that the trial court made sufficient findings of 
fact to support its ruling and, accordingly, its decision should be affirmed. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs request that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending 
this appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2001. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
BryonX R&ievent^ ) 
Attorney/for Appellees 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIEGFRIED POLLESCHE and 
SHERYL HOLMES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
MOUNTAIN TECH MILL '& CAB I RET, 
INCy, and RUSS GROOMER, 
Defendants, 
CASE NUMBER: 
970907680 CV 
DEPOSITION OF: 
SHERYL HOLMES 
TAKEN: 
September 10, 1999 
REPORTED BY: 
Mary D. Quinn 
CSR, RPR, CRR 
The Deposition of SHERYL HOLMES, taken on 
behalf of the Defendants, at 4800 South 150 West, 
Murray, Utah on September 10, 1999 as reported by 
MARY D. QUINN, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah. COPY 
REPORTING SERVICES, INC 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. WATTS 
1 but I'm sure they can do it. 
2 MR. WATTS: Just if we can obtain the front 
3 and back, that may clarify some things. 
4 Q In your Complaint, the basis of this suit 
5 in general terms as I understand it, Sheryl, is that 
6 you believe that the cabinets that were constructed 
7 and installed into your home were not of the same 
8 quality as the cabinets that -- and materials that 
9 are on display. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Correct? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q The display you're referring to are the 
14 displays at Mountain Tech Mill and Cabinet, correct? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And specifically, the display that is 
17 mounted in the room we are in -- I'm going to ask you 
18 and ask Bryan to go to that display and tell me 
19 specifically how you believe that this display 
20 cabinet is different from the cabinets that are 
21 installed in your home. 
22 MR. BENEVENTO: We're not going to do that. 
23 You haven't established the foundation and she 
24 doesn't have the foundation to say this is the 
25 mock-up that she used to rely upon. 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. WATTS 
1 A Not necessarily. Sometimes I remember 
2 things by other dates in the Day-Timers. I do not 
3 recall when the sub-zero was delivered. 
4 Q Okay. Do you still have those -- the 
5 Day-Timer for 1996? 
6 A I would have to check. 
7 Q Will you do so? 
8 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
9 MR. WATTS: Let's take a break. 
10 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
11 MR. WATTS: Back on the record. While we 
12 were off the record, I placed a phone call to Judge 
13 Iwasaki, spoke to his clerk Janet. The judge is on a 
14 quick lunch, was not available. 
15 I was explaining to Mr. Benevento that the 
16 scope of my examination in large part will focus upon 
17 the claimed deficiencies in the cabinets installed in 
18 the plaintiff's home in relation to the cabinet 
19 display at Mountain Tech Mill and Cabinet. Mr. 
20 Benevento has objected. 
21 I've inquired as to whether he wishes to 
22 continue with his objection. If so, then we'll have 
23 to notice up a hearing before Judge Iwasaki. Does 
24 that correctly state --
25 MR. BENEVENTO: Somewhat. Three issues, if 
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EXAMINATION BY MR* WATTS 
1 we're going to be on the record. First one is that I 
2 object to the line of questioning because there's 
3 been no foundation that this particular cabinet that 
4 he now wants Miss Holmes to inspect was indeed the 
5 cabinet display that she inspected and is the subject 
6 matter of the Complaint* 
7 Second of all, I don't think it's appropriate 
8 to suspend the deposition solely on that issue* I 
9 think you are incumbent to, under Rule 1 and 2 of the 
10 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to expedite the 
11 discovery process and complete the rest of your 
12 questions and reserve this particular issue for 
13 hearing if, indeed, we go forward. 
14 And so I would request that you reconsider 
15 suspending at this point and completing the 
16 deposition other than that subject matter. 
17 And number three is I haven't had a chance to 
18 talk to my client to explain to her the burden of 
19 coming back a second time in light of the judge's 
20 unavailability. So I don't think it's appropriate to 
21 have me respond on the record based upon my inability 
22 to talk to her about those risks. 
23 MR. WATTS: You're welcome to take a few 
24 minutes and allow Mr. Benevento an opportunity to 
25 talk to Miss Holmes so that can be explained. 
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is, as reiterated by your attorney, is that you do 
not have an independent recollection as to whether 
this was the cabinet design or the cabinets that you 
viewed in 1996? Is that an accurate representation? 
MR. BENEVENTO: Let the record reflect that 
Mr. Watts is pointing at a particular display within 
what's called the marble showroom. 
MR. WATTS: Cherry wood cabinets. 
THE WITNESS: I do not know if that was the 
mock display that I looked at. 
MR. WATTS: Okay. Let me come back to 
that. You've alleged in your Complaint a series of 
perceived deficiencies. Where did I put it? 
MR. BENEVENTO: They're in the affidavit as 
well. 
Q (BY MR. WATTS) When you say that there 
are open joints at the top of the cabinet ends, what 
specifically are you referring to? Are you 
referring -- when you say cabinet ends, what are the 
cabinet ends you're referring to? 
A Some of these items you'll have to go 
through with Sig. That's one I'll let you ask him. 
Q Okay. So you don't -- as it relates to the 
Complaint, you don't have any personal knowledge as 
to -- personal opinion as to what --. 
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